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ABSTRACT
During the 1980s, attempts to improve the export and import competing 
performance of local firms were continually frustrated by frequent changes in emphasis by 
policymakers in Canberra. It is argued that these changes resulted from the industry policy 
debate being conducted by the Treasury (and IAC) and the Department of Industry, 
Technology and Commerce (and the AMC).
The roots of this debate can be traced to an earlier industry policy debate conducted 
in the United States. However, while the Australian debate remained within the realm of 
economic philosophy, its US counterpart has developed to incorporate the interests of 
domestic corporations, with a renewed emphasis on the importance of demand maintenance 
and protection as part of an export development strategy.
It is argued that Australian policy in the 1990s should focus on measures to assist 
local firms to capture export demand, and that the best way of doing this is within an East- 
Asia/Pacific trading bloc.
* The author was previously Manager—Economic Development at the City of Melbourne and involved in 
the implementation of industry policy in conjunction with local firms throughout the 1980s. She 
currently works in the Department of Economics at the University of Wollongong.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Hawke Labor Government (1983-1991) was characterised by a number of 
innovative approaches to economic management, including incomes policy, job creation 
programs, deregulation of the financial system, and floating the exchange rate. Innovation 
necessarily generates debate at both the academic and popularist level and this certainly 
happened throughout this regime. One of the most vigorous areas of debate, although it 
occurred predominantly within the bureaucracy, has been over industry policy.
An innovative package of industry assistance measures was outlined in the initial 
Accord document. These were aimed at improving the productivity and efficiency of 
Australian firms in order to improve their capacity to compete against the steady steam of 
imports which had been invading the domestic economy since the latter 1970s, and to 
encourage the integration of Australian industry into the global market through an 
expansion of manufactured exports. Implicit within these policies was a deliberate attempt 
to intervene in the economy in order to change the industrial structure towards 
internationally competitive industries. Such ambitious objectives for economic management 
were sure to create policy debate.
Yet despite the considerable public effort which has been directed towards industry 
policy over the past decade, the restructuring process cannot be called a success. Imports 
have increased their presence in most manufactured goods markets. Export performance 
outside traditional areas has been poor and spasmodic. Unemployment is at a post-war high 
and entrenched in the older industrial regions of the country. Few new industries have 
emerged.
This paper argues that the factor lying behind this failure has been policy-makers’ 
concern with the philosophical aspects of the industry policy debate, which was initiated in 
the United States prior to the 1983 Presidential election and continued between various 
departments in Canberra. This debate directed attention too far towards the issue of whether 
Governments should intervene in the economy (the ‘level playing field’ position) and away 
from the practicalities of achieving structural change and the need for government to
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exercise political influence in opening up new markets for domestic firms if export 
expansion is to be a reality.
A brief summary of the industrial policy debate in Australia is presented, indicating 
the frequent changes which occurred as the prevalent position moved jerkingly towards 
non-intervention. It is argued that insight into the factors lying behind these changes can be 
achieved by examining the much briefer USA industry debate which saw the supremacy of 
the argument for macro-economic management over interventionist activities, following a 
series of papers by the Brookings Institute in Washington.
However, it is argued that macro-economic policy settings alone will not solve deep- 
seated structural problems. This point was recognised by American business analysts who 
have continued the debate after economists considered it resolved. This position is now 
exercising considerable pressure on the Bush regime to undertake a more interventionist 
pro-domestic industry position within world trade.
The paper concludes by arguing that Australia, having learnt one set of lessons from 
the economic industry policy debate in the United States, now needs to examine the new 
debate in order to develop a successful industry policy for the 1990s. Most particularly, 
governments need to play an active role in supporting the restructuring of domestic 
industry, and that this will be most successful when demand conditions are known with a 
relatively high degree of certainty. Thus, the newly industrialising East Asian countries and 
bilateral trading blocs offer a better model for industry policy and should provide the basis 
for a new industry policy debate in the 1990s.
2 THE INDUSTRY POLICY DEBATE IN AUSTRALIA
One of the major issues affecting the Australian economy over the past decade has 
been the industry policy debate. A new approach to industry policy targeted towards 
structural change was included as part of the Accord Mark I package in 1983. However, 
since then it has undergone some remarkable changes of direction.
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The original formulation included the primary objective of full employment with 
priority given to manufacturing jobs, comprehensive planning mechanisms including 
overall policy co-ordination and industry sector strategies, maintenance of protection levels, 
introduction of non-tariff trade barriers, regulation of multinationals, and improved access 
to finance for business involving deregulation of the banking system (Statement o f Accord, 
1983).
Once in power, ‘improving international competitiveness’ was added to the objectives 
and by 1985, ‘increasing exports’ replaced this as the primary objective of industry policy, 
with employment issues assigned to macroeconomic policy. Comprehensive planning was 
also rejected, to be replaced with concepts such as ‘co-ordination of policies’ (1985), 
‘facilitation’ (1987) and ‘assistance in restructuring’ (1990). The focus of industry 
assistance also changed over the decade from employment to productivity and production 
efficiency (1985-86), to management and marketing (1987-88), to pragmatic ‘deals’ with 
specific firms to combat specific problems (1989-91). The priority given to trade increased 
during this time as the burgeoning current account deficit forced an increasing emphasis on 
exports. Moreover, by 1987 any desire to encourage import substitution had disappeared.
These changes in direction (see Appendix 1 for a brief summary) were the 
consequence of a substantial ideological debate occurring between the main economic 
departments during this period. On one side was the Department of Industry, Technology 
and Commerce and the Australian Manufacturing Council favouring an interventionist 
industry policy. On the other, the Treasury and the Industries Commission (then the 
Industries Assistance Commission) favoured a non-interventionist, free-market, 
macroeconomic approach, now dubbed ‘economic rationalism’. The decade saw a general 
movement away from an interventionist philosophy and the ascendency of the second 
ideological position, which fed through into continual changes in direction for industry 
policy and in the guidelines applied to industry assistance programs.
One significant departure from this process occurred in 1988 when a much more pro­
active stance occurred, advocating the co-ordination of the activities of all the relevant 
government departments to assist the export push. Concepts such as use of diplomatic
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consulates abroad to feed back economic information and assist Australian firms, the re­
orientation of aid funds to provide soft loans to countries accepting Australian tenders, the 
encouragement of the export of Australian expertise, technical, training and marketing skills 
in agricultural and minerals industries, and of public authorities to tender for overseas 
infrastructure projects were introduced (Senator Gareth Evans, 1988). However, by 1989 
the focus had returned to non-intervention and ‘level playing fields’.
Industry policy debates can be interpreted as revolving around two questions. One: is 
there an appropriate role for Government intervention in the economy through industry 
policy? Two: what are the most effective mechanisms by which industry policy can 
improve the nation’s industrial structure and efficiency of resource use?
Most small economies—for example, Canada, the Scandinavian countries, the Asian 
Newly Industrialising Countries or NICs (Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore)— have been 
mainly concerned with how governments can assist in the development of new industries 
and areas of international competitiveness, that is, the second question. Australia, however, 
has primarily focussed on the first question, apparently following the industry policy 
debate within the United States, Japan and the EEC. Thus, it is tempting to argue that 
Australia has been playing in the wrong league throughout the past decade, and that an 
industry policy debate orientated towards other smaller economies would have been more 
effective than the one actually conducted.
This paper will argue that the Australian debate, regardless of which question is being 
addressed, has missed an essential element—demand, and that this component has not 
been neglected by our fellow proponents of free trade and market-determined outcomes— 
Japan and the United States. If Australia is to consider a new mix of policies for the 1990s, 
this mix must include demand management policies at both the macroeconomic and 
microeconomic levels.
Before developing a possible set of new policies, however, it is useful to review the 
debate which is occurring in the United States and to determine to what extent intervention 
and demand management are likely to be part of its economic policies in the 1990s.
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3 THE INDUSTRY POLICY DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES
Industry policy was pronounced dead in the United States in 1984 by Robert Reich, 
one of its principle advocates, as ‘one of those rare ideas that has moved swiftly from 
obscurity to meaninglessness without any intervening period of coherence’. For American 
economists, the debate was effectively closed by a number of papers from the Brookings 
Institute in 1983 which asserted the ascendency of macro-economic policy in solving the 
problems of unemployment and declining international competitiveness (Norton, 1986). 
This dominance in the policy mix was further justified by substantial increases in jobs and 
manufacturing exports following the devaluation of the $US in 1987. In the United States, 
arguments in favour of an interventionist industry policy were presented by the Union 
movement through the AFL-CIO, by the labour-market analysts Bluestone and Harrison, 
by the Harvard Kennedy School of Government’s Magaziner and Reich and the Berkeley 
Graduate School of Management’s Cohen and Zysman, in the run-up to the 1983 
Presidential elections. The short-lived interventionist debate was defeated by a combination 
of Reagan’s resounding political victory and the free market/free trade logic from the 
macro-economists’ debunking of the concepts of sector targeting, American de­
industrialisation, and the competence of MITI-style planning in the Japanese economic 
resurgence.1 The near fatal shot fired by the Brookings Institute researchers against 
industry policy in the United States had four essential elements (Schultze, 1983).
i That the major western nations are not de-industrialising and therefore 
do not need massive intervention to change their industrial structure.
Brookings’ Lawrence and Li tan argued that the US economy was undergoing a 
structural shift towards high-technology industries and away from old-line heavy industries 
and that this was highly desirable, although it did bring with it certain social costs for those 
workers lacking the skills to be redeployed and for residents in regions affected.
1 A review of this debate is available in R.D. Norton, ‘Industrial Policy and American Renewal’, 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol XXIV (March 1986), pp. 1-40; and K.P. Jarboe, ‘A Readers 
Guide to the Industry Policy Debate’, California Management Review, Vol. XXVII, No. 4, 1985, 
pp. 198-219.
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The Brookings authors argued that the fall in manufacturing production being 
observed was due to macro-economic problems, in that cyclical movements in 
manufacturing are more severe in recessions than GNP as a whole and that appreciation of 
the exchange rate in the 1980s discouraged exports and encouraged imports. The corollary 
of this is that manufacturing will increase more rapidly in economic recoveries and that 
depreciation of the exchange rate will expand manufacturing exports.
ii That industry policy and government direction of the economy was not 
the main cause of economic success in Asian countries such as Japan.
Rather than providing leadership or direction to areas for new investment, it was 
argued that the main role of the Government was to provide an accommodating and 
supportive role to the market. The substantial investment funds controlled by the Japanese 
government agencies such as its Fiscal Investment and Loan Program and the Japanese 
Development Bank were deployed in response to political interests to relieve pressure 
points in the economy, rather than to facilitate the expansion of targeted industries. While 
the role of MITI in directing investment towards certain successful industries is 
acknowledged, it is argued that there are as many stories of failures and no evidence that 
the market would not have achieved the same result.
iii There is n® set of economic criteria which can determine a ‘winning’ 
industrial structure which a government can create in terms of which 
new industries to encourage and which older industries to protect or 
restructure.
This critique acknowledges that comparative advantage is no longer a static concept 
determined by a nation’s relative endowment of factors of production, but a dynamic 
concept determined as much by the historical factors and entrepreneurial skills within a 
particular firm as by national cost factors applying to a specific industry. In addition, any 
attempt to direct investment funds towards broad categories such as high value-added
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activities or to protect strategic industries in decline must be cognisant of the level of overall 
market demand for those products and the main impact is likely to be to produce an over 
supply in such industries unless substantial market failure can be shown to exist.
ix Democratic political traditions make II extremely difficult for 
Government institutions to make the hard choices between firms, cities 
or groups of workers which are to benefit from industry policy 
programs and which are to be left to ‘die9.
It was argued that pressures within the American political process to use ‘fairness’ 
rather than ‘efficiency’ as the criteria for allocating public resources means industry policy 
would degenerate into an excuse for maintaining existing economic inefficiencies.
The Brookings critique concluded that America’s structural problems will be solved 
by the market once the macro-economic distortions in the exchange rate are resolved 
through reduced budget deficits, inflationary expectations and interest rates. The 
appropriate role for government activity is to ameliorate the human costs of this 
restructuring process through increased unemployment benefits, retraining and regional 
assistance programs and actions targeted towards the most disadvantaged groups in the 
population.
4 LESSONS FOR THE 1990S
The Brookings critique has been examined in detail because it was directed against 
the somewhat compelling argument that the role of government intervention is to create a 
role for the nation within the emerging global market place. It also highlights the main 
issues which underlay the industry policy debate in Australia. It comes down on the side of 
the free traders in that market forces and profit-maximising private investors are seen as the 
best determinants of that role in a world where there is little economic direction available to 
guide such government planning or public incentives. This reflects the position of the 
economic rationalists who have dominated the debate in Canberra.
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While the Brookings critique of industry policy is substantial in terms of economic 
logic, it is worth noting a number of issues still remaining which indicate current economic 
problems are more deep seated than this analysis would suggest and that macro-economic 
solutions alone will not resolve these problems.
4 .1  Productivity declines
Macro-economic policies resulting in a devaluation of the exchange rate have clearly 
improved the export performance of manufacturers both in Australia and the United States 
since these articles were written (Gamaut, 1991). However, reliance on a continued 
devaluation of the exchange rate to maintain export performance carries with it major 
difficulties for the long-term development of the economy. In particular, it requires a 
continued reduction in living standards through reduced real wages and incomes as an 
increased proportion of national income is required to repay foreign debt commitments.
Moreover, the structural adjustments that have accompanied the process have seen a 
decline in rates of productivity growth as workers displaced from older heavy industries 
have been forced to seek alternative employment in low-wage, low-skill service-sector jobs 
within the hospitality, retailing and health sectors. Such jobs, which imply poorer working 
conditions because of their part-time, casual character will continue to reduce overall 
national living standards, even if productivity and incomes increase in the traded goods 
sectors.
Unless specific policies are introduced to encourage new high-tech products and the 
adoption of advanced technologies in all sectors of the economy, average productivity will 
continue to decline and few new jobs will be created, causing the non-traded service sectors 
to become a low-income, low-productivity reservoir for an increasing proportion of the 
workforce. This in turn will result in an increasing division of the workforce into ‘haves’ 
and ‘have nots’ and major social problems in the future. Retraining programs, while clearly 
part of the answer, will not help if only low-skill jobs are available for their graduates.
9
4 .2  The need for strong government action to create a favourable climate
for private sector investment
The argument that the Japanese economy is now sufficiently advanced and Japanese 
business sufficiently entrepreneurial to rely on private-sector market decisions may be valid 
at present. However, Japan and other Asian countries did not obtain this position through 
the unfettered workings of free trade and competition. Their success was guided initially by 
strong government direction and a policy mix specifically aimed at achieving a well 
articulated ‘vision’ of the future which was, and still is, recognised by all players— 
business, workers, consumers and bureaucrats (Johnson, 1984).
This policy mix consisted of tax laws to promote high levels of savings and 
investment, facilitated access by local businesses to known technologies in order to rapidly 
upgrade their productivity, monetary and budgetary policies specifically aimed at 
stimulating economic growth, and protection of large segments of the domestic market 
against imported manufactured goods in order to control trade deficits. Within such a 
framework, it was relatively easy for investors and entrepreneurs to take the risks and 
business decisions necessary to create an efficient, innovative, technologically advanced 
and internationally competitive industrial structure. Even today, while embracing the 
philosophy of free trade, established supply relationships between Japanese firms make it 
extremely difficult for imports to gain a major foothold in this market effectively preserving 
demand for domestic firms.
4 .3  Creating—rather than picking—winners
The arguments relating to the incapacity of the public sector to pick winners in a 
world where competitive advantage relies on individual entrepreneurial skills rather than 
known factor endowments are also well founded. However, it does not preclude an 
industry policy mix structured around creating winners, or, in other words, diagnosing 
why local firms are not successfully competing in the international market—despite a 
favourable macro-economic climate—and then implementing specific actions to overcome 
these problems.
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Such a diagnostic will throw up issues such as a lack of information about 
international markets, lack of access to international distribution channels, failure to 
understand marketing strategies in foreign product markets, packaging problems, scale and 
technology problems, lack of management training and, most particularly, a lack of on-the- 
job experience with exporting. In Australia, programs such as Austrade, the New Industry 
Strategies and the National Industry Extension Scheme exist to combat these problems. A 
continuation of such programs is essential if Australia is to have a manufacturing presence 
in the emerging global economy.
The limited success such programs have had to date does not reflect the failure of 
entrepreneurship as such in Australia. Rather it reflects a failure to recognise the importance 
of the demand side of the marke tin which these firms operate and the need to use 
government action to help secure this demand in line with a well articulated ‘vision’ 
statement referred to above.
4 .4  Poverty of Neo-classical micro-economic analysis
Throughout the 1980s, a number of ‘new theories’ of international trade were 
developed, combining industrial organisation and trade theory. In this approach, perfect 
competition was replaced by imperfect markets with trade dominated by (multinational) 
oligopolistic firms. This allowed trade theory to accommodate increasing returns and the 
existence of economic rents, highly mobile capital, uneven rates of development and the 
importance of innovation in determining a firm’s and a national economy’s rate of growth 
(Krugman, 1990).
From this approach, strategic trade policy was developed with suggestions that 
Government intervention can be used to support the export activities of selected local firms 
and so capture some of the ensuring rents to enhance domestic national income and to more 
than offset the costs of the subsidy. Academic economic analysis of this approach in the 
United States has run up against the quandary identified by public choice theory and 
expressed by Schultze in the earlier discussion relating to its vulnerability to vested interest- 
group pressure within a democratic process.
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However, contrary to these concerns, Australian policy makers have shown 
themselves capable of making the hard decisions in terms of allowing inefficient industries, 
firms and regions to decline in the face of foreign competition and economic restructuring 
and to limit industry assistance to selected industries and firms. This suggests the 
deficiency may rather lie within the state of the analysis described above.
It provides very little understanding of the firm’s growth process within an 
increasingly integrated global economy and the importance these firms’ strategies have in 
determining the role which particular national economies are likely to play within 
international markets. Consequently, the inclusion of more realistic assumptions relating to 
economies of scale and factor mobility are offset by a lack of policy prescription and a de 
facto fall back to the free-trade position of the static, perfectly competitive model (ABARE, 
1990).
Rather, it would be more appropriate to expand on the progress already made 
toward a more realistic microeconomic basis for trade theory by achieving a better 
understanding of the political processes affecting industry policy decisions. This would 
involve integrating some of the analysis developed within the management discipline 
(described in the next section) and work of the role of the firm by economic geography and 
political economy researchers to develop clear, implementable policy prescriptions for 
imperfect world markets.
5 THE INDUSTRY POLICY DEBATE AMONG AMERICAN  
BUSINESSES
In the United States, the lack of an economic response to these issues is being filled 
from the corporate sectors with a series of papers relating to the ‘unfair competition’ being 
faced by American exporters, and solutions offered under the banner of ‘Strategic Trade 
Theory’. This approach advocates the use of export subsidies, non-tariff protection of the 
domestic market and countervailing action against support provided to their firms by 
competitor governments to encourage exports (Krugman, 1983). While such a program
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may have little to support it in terms of economic logic, it clearly has appeal to business 
sectors with strong links to the US Government. The inevitable results of such a process 
will be reduced growth in world income, but there will be an unequal distribution of that 
income. This will provide an incentive for the more powerful trading nations to adopt such 
an approach, despite its ‘beggar my neighbour’ impact on smaller traders. This approach 
gave us the American wheat export enhancement subsidy which is causing such anguish to 
the free traders in the Australian farm lobby at the moment.
This component of the debate was primarily developed within the business schools in 
the United States and presents the position of the American domestic corporation, 
particularly those in exporting, import competing and new technology products. The 
formulation presents the idea of ‘Fair Trade’ rather than ‘Free Trade’. American industry, it 
is claimed, is forced to compete in the world economy on unfair conditions wherein their 
competitors are allowed access to the United States while American firms are denied access 
to markets in overseas countries. Furthermore, competing products are provided with cost 
reduction incentives not available to firms in the United States.
The discussions also invoke the problem of an innovative company carrying the R & 
D costs of a new product and then being forced to share the market with a ‘foreign’ 
competitor who can enter the market as sales begin to take off, without being burdened 
with the upfront product development costs (McKenna, Borrus & Cohen, 1984). These 
problems are claimed to be limiting innovation and investment in US industry to levels well 
below those required to sustain economic growth and its position in world trade. 
Consequently, the US Government has now introduced a series of measures aimed at 
protecting local innovation from foreign competition (Mowery and Rosenberg, 1989).
The policy prescriptions arising from this approach come under the general banner of 
‘creating a level playing field’, but in the context of duplicating the restraints on trade and 
incentives available to the competitors or using the power of the US Government to force 
competitors into ‘fair trading’ arrangements. The ‘free trade’ solution of ‘trading US 
exports of oranges and beef against Japanese high-tech incursions into the US market. . .  
will simply not work to resolve the capital formation dilemma or in the long run—which
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may be short—to protect the strength of the US economy’ (McKenna, Bonus & Cohen, 
1984, p. 22).
A more moderate version of business school industry policy has focussed on the 
need to improve the management of American companies to improve the flexibility of their 
responses and the quality of their products to allow them to compete with their overseas 
rivals (Wheelwright, 1985).2
In this formulation, the Americans using flexible manufacturing practices and 
processes see their future in ‘niche’ high-tech products within the Asia/Pacific Rim region. 
As this is exactly the same market which has been identified as Australia’s area of future 
comparative advantage, it means Australian exporters will in the future be subjected to the 
same scrutiny and tactics from the powerful American corporate lobby as the European 
wheat farmers have had to face.
6 AN INDUSTRY POLICY DEBATE FOR THE 199§s
US economists might applaud the present position being taken by Australian 
policymakers, but American policymakers are clearly following another program, at least 
until the ‘unfair’ practices of the other players in their league (EEC, Japan) have been 
corrected. This program contains three elements which warrant further attention. One: the 
exercise of political and economic power, which is euphemistically labelled the ‘new world 
order’. Two: demand expansion and protection for local exporting firms, which is 
euphemistically called ‘voluntary restraint agreements’ or ‘strategic trade theory’. Three: 
protection for local innovation in order to encourage those new industries which are 
considered essential for new economic growth.
By focusing on the economic aspects of the US policy debate, Australian 
policymakers have lost sight of some of the main issues arising from the increased 
integration of world economies.
2 It may be of some interest to note that the example of the Mitsubishi take over of Chryslers’ 
automotive plant in Adelaide is cited as an example of where changes from a static to a dynamic 
management process have been implemented, with subsequent improvements in profits and market 
share.
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Most particularly, they have ignored the importance of market demand and 
government direction and support in ensuring private-sector investments are made in line 
with the long-run growth requirements of the economy. All the successful Asian 
industrialising countries from Japan downwards have relied on clearly articulated 
government economic direction, or ‘visions’ and protected domestic markets at the various 
stages of the supply chain. This lesson has clearly been learned by American businesses 
and the protection of domestic demand and the use of political power to expand foreign 
markets are now part of the trade policies of that country.
Australia obviously does not have the capacity to exercise political and economic 
power in the global economy on this scale (Industries Assistance Commission, 1989). Nor 
is its domestic economy anywhere near large enough to provide scope for global scale 
industries to develop utilising this market alone. Thus, demand maintenance and expansion 
policies for this country need to focus on the use of government diplomatic activity and 
bilateral trade negotiations to secure export markets for our products in exchange for 
negotiated access for complementary imports within regional trading blocs—Gamaut’s 
North Asian Ascendency, for example.
The industry policy debate also covered the issue of why the range of incentives 
provided failed to stimulate an improved export performance. This debate has most recently 
focussed on the lack of entrepreneurial skill within large segments of Australian business 
(Argy, 1991)— a lack of the skill to recognise opportunities, seek out new markets, and 
undertake the investments required to develop products and successfully sell in these 
markets. This lack of skill has been blamed squarely on the years of protection and a 
remedial dose of import competition has been diagnosed by Treasury. Reduced tariff levels 
have been accompanied by a range of industry assistance programs providing incentives to 
encourage local firms to become more efficient and export-orientated in their production 
mix.
The failure of management to respond adequately to those assistance incentives must 
be acknowledged and examined for solutions if the economy is to move forward. Again the 
missing element is demand. Business responds to sales. Entrepreneurs invest to expand
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output to meet demand. Growing demand reduces risks and encourages business 
confidence. Until markets have been established and future growth becomes apparent, 
business analysis would suggest that entrepreneurs will not respond to incentives to 
improve technology, research, work practices or product design, enter joint ventures and 
collaborations, and undertake the other activities prescribed by current industry policy.
Bilateral trade negotiations within the expanding Asian trade blocs provide the best 
method of assuring markets while ensuring correct profit signals are provided to 
entrepreneurs. Sectors with a comparative advantage within the bloc will expand, those 
which cannot compete with imports will decline, resources moving to improve efficiency 
and labour productivity, as prescribed in microeconomic theory but within a definable 
economic space where demand is predictable and market analysis constrained.
7 CONCLUSION
Restoration of business confidence in Australia now requires government direction 
involving clear indications of where the Australian economy should be going in the 1990s 
and some assurances that those businesses that act within these guidelines will receive 
rewards. The frequent changes in the direction of industry policy in the 1980s did nothing 
to establish business’s confidence to participate in the global economy. Rather, it 
discouraged the long-term commitment required for sustained export performance, instead 
encouraging opportunistic sorties, while the bulk of sales remained dependant on the more 
coherent and intelligible domestic market.
This paper thus argues that the industry programs introduced in the 1980s were 
essentially correct in terms of both economic philosophy and policy objectives. However, 
the frequent changes of direction, sector targeting, and revisions to guidelines in response 
to overseas industry policy debates has seriously affected their creditability and rendered 
them ineffectual. The industry policy debate for the 1990s, regardless of party politics, is 
about how to resurrect these policies, with clear long-term guidelines for participation by
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Australian firms willing to invest their energies and resources in modernising production 
and expanding sales.
However, these policies must now acknowledge the importance of demand in 
assessing business investment decisions. A return to the approach proposed in 1988 is 
required whereby government and diplomatic actions are used to secure export expansion 
within negotiated bilateral trading arrangements among complementary and equal 
economies in Asia, Africa and the Pacific.
In this, clear examples of successful government direction of the economy are 
available from many of the East Asian industrialising countries, who in turn adapted the 
Japanese model to their particular problems. The East Asian model is now being suggested 
as a possible development model for Eastern Europe (Dickie, 1991) and is surely 
appropriate to their near neighbour, Australia.
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APPENDIX 1: 
A POTTED HISTORY OF INDUSTRY POLICY IN AUSTRALIA, 
1983-1990  
1983 — ‘Idealistic’
• Statement of Accord by the Australian Labor Party and ACTU regarding Economic 
Policy.
• Objective of full employment.
• Comprehensive planning mechanisms.
• Commitment to develop long term objectives and clear priorities.
• Priority to co-ordination of government policies to achieve objectives.
• Program of comprehensive industry planning, involving industry plans and strategies 
for each industry sector.
• Provision of support to local industries through:
— protection maintained at current levels,
— introduction of non-tariff trade barriers,
— regulation of transnational corporations, and
— improved access to finance (deregulation of banking and introduction of 
new institutions)
• Priority given to manufacturing.
1984 — ‘Realism with Power’
• Integration of trade and industry policies with recognition of need to increase exports 
and improve competitiveness in the Asia-Pacific region.
• Rejection of the concept of planning (but establishment of EPAC and a revised AMC).
• Recognition of problems arising from competing ideologies within government 
departments.
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• Affirmation of role of government and rejection of free-market approach in industrial 
restructuring and achievement of international competitiveness.
• Identification and targeting of specific industrial sectors for development of industry 
plans and strategies.
• Establishment of policies to provide positive industry assistance with priorities to 
technology, R & D, investment, education and training.
• Emphasis on manufacturing industry.
1985 — ‘Disillusion’
• Focus on macro-economic concerns, particularly the Current Account Deficit.
• Recognition of the lack of international competitiveness of Australian manufacturing.
• Priority to need to expand exports.
• Recognition of need to subject Australian industry to the ‘discipline of the market 
place’.
• Role of Government seen as co-ordination of policies to support industry, rather than 
intervention.
• Priority given to macro-economic issues over industry policy.
• Industry policies became focused on means of improving process technologies 
(CAD/CAM, FMS), with recognition of problems in quality, innovation, design, 
marketing, business management as major issues affecting competitiveness.
• Recognition of poor research and innovation record of Australian firms and priority 
given to developing new policies in this area.
• Industry assistance became more closely targeted to particular sectors.
• Emphasis still on manufacturing but importance of exports of some services (tourism, 
health and education) recognised.
1986 — ‘Revival of Confidence’
• ‘Growth through Exports’—predominant emphasis on exports due to balance of 
payments problem.
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• Role of government seen as creating the ‘right’ environment for private business 
investment.
• The relative merits of macro-economic solutions (for example, devaluation) versus 
interventionist industry policy was publicly debated.
• Industry strategies became less important with most emphasis on policies to improve 
productivity, quality, design, marketing, and delivery capacity of local firms.
• Industry assistance consisted of positive help to exports, but with increasingly less 
emphasis on import replacement and the domestic market.
• Emphasis on ‘elaborately transformed’ manufacturing sectors.
1987 — ‘Retreat from Industry Policy’
• Total priority given to exports, import competition was ignored.
• Role of government was seen as to facilitate private investment by removing barriers.
• Emphasis on improving management skills with new programs, such as NIES and 
Partners For Development, introduced.
• Emphasis on individual firms and internal efficiency issues rather than industry sectors.
• Priority to ‘World Class Manufacturing’.
1988 — ‘All Out National Effort’
• Objective of creating an ‘export culture’ in Australia by changing the attitudes of 
business and the community.
• Government took a pro-active position to encourage more trade by using overseas staff 
to support exporters and to obtain foreign market intelligence and foreign aid facilities 
to support Australian overseas tenderers.
• Priority to promote multilateral trade through GATT negotiations, to pressure Asian 
countries to lower tariffs.
• Industry policy objectives were adopted by other departments, for example, Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, Science, Agriculture and Resources, and Communications; and new 
Ministry for Trade Negotiations established.
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• Industry assistance focused on overseas marketing strategies for both private firms and 
public authorities.
• Encouragement to tender for overseas infrastructure projects and export R & D, 
technology, training and management expertise in agricultural and resource industries.
• Support for collaborative arrangements between firms, that is, co-operatives or joint 
ventures to over come problems of small firm size and to gain access to foreign 
markets.
1989 —‘Re-assessment and Re-affirmation’
• Release of ‘Gamaut Report’, ‘Hughes Report’ and Nieuwenheysen book supporting a 
freer approach to trade.
• Recommitment of Government support to tariff reductions and the Uruguay round of 
GATT rather than bilateral trading bloc arrangements.
• Acknowledgement of importance of Asian-Pacific region to Australia’s economic future
• Priority given to micro-economic reform in order to improve efficiency and productivity 
and foster a competitive environment.
• Focus on issues of international regulations and standards in health, environment and 
safety areas.
• Major concerns with macro-economic problems such as the current account deficit, 
stabilising the foreign debt and high levels of domestic demand.
• Industry assistance programs subjected to a process of review and evaluation generally 
resulting in their extension with modification.
• Industry policy focused on promoting productivity at the company level, improving 
innovation and marketing, and increasing the level of Australian-based decision-making 
and strategic development within firms.
• Recognition of the importance of ‘adding value’ to resources in order to move into the 
faster growing sectors of world trade.
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1990 — ‘Reinforcing Past Gains’
• Release of AMC report advocating increased support to manufacturing industry to 
improve international competitiveness.
• Twin focus on objectives of economically and environmentally sustainable growth, for 
example, exports and R & D.
• Role of Government was seen as to assist particular industries through the process of 
restructuring by identifying opportunities, assisting firms to negotiate export contracts 
or technological investment ‘deals’.
• Ideological arguments about the relative merits of intervention versus ‘level playing 
fields’ occurring between DITAC and Treasury (IAC) received public prominence.
• Industry policy was increasingly practised by ‘fine tuning’ existing programs and 
developing firm specific solutions to exporting problems being encountered.
• Priority was given to natural resources, high technology manufacturing and food 
processing.
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